Determinants of State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Assessment Based on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project by Carment, David et al.
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2008 
* The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, emails: 
david_carment@carleton.ca (David Carment, corresponding author); yiagadeesen_samy@carleton.ca 
(Yiagadeesen Samy); stewartprest@gmail.com (Stewart Prest) 
This is a revised version of a paper originally prepared for the UNU-WIDER conference on Fragile 
States–Fragile Groups, directed by Mark McGillivray and Wim Naudé. The conference was jointly 
organized by UNU-WIDER and UN-DESA, with a financial contribution from the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the contributions to its project on Fragility and Development 
from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, and the UK Department for International Development—DFID. Programme contributions are 
also received from the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—
Sida). 
ISSN 1810-2611   ISBN 978-92-9230-094-4 
Research Paper No. 2008/46 
 
Determinants of State Fragility 
and Implications for Aid Allocation 
 
An Assessment Based on the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy Project 
 
David Carment, Stewart Prest,  




This paper is derived from our ongoing research on fragile states funded by the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) to help policymakers and analysts make decisions 
on where and how to allocate aid, especially in fragile state environments. In order for 
development assistance to have a measurable and positive impact on fragile states, it is 
necessary to understand both how and why they become fragile. First, we reconceptualize the 
meaning of state fragility with equal attention given to the authority, legitimacy and capacity of 
a state, collectively referred to as ALC. Measures of these ALC components corresponding to 
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six different categories of state performance—economics, governance, security and crime, 
human development, demographics, and the environment—are collected for all countries for the 
period 1999-2005. Initial testing of our fragility index shows that fragility is driven by a number 
of factors, of which the level of development seems to be more important. We complement this 
analysis by examining state fragility using the ALC framework. Overall, the approach presented 
has the distinct advantage of identifying country-specific patterns of fragility while at the same 
time allowing for broad strategically relevant measures of comparative performance that can be 
of use to policymakers regarding allocation of aid at the sectoral and programming level. 
Notwithstanding the fact that aid may be allocated for political and strategic reasons, and that 
fragile states are under funded, we argue that aid that does flow to fragile states could be better 
targeted. Specifically, it could strengthen the underlying determinants of fragility by addressing 
fragile states’ distinct and country-specific weaknesses in authority, legitimacy and capacity. 
Finally, we discuss policy implications of our analysis and directions for future research.  
Acronyms 
ALC  authority, legitimacy and capacity 
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency  
CIFP  Country Indicators for Fragility  
DFID  Department for International Development  
GDP  gross domestic product 
GNI  gross national income 
HDI  human development index  
LICUS  low-income country under stress  
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PPP  purchasing power parity 1 
1 Introduction:  assessing  fragility beyond conflict 
This paper unfolds in five parts. In the first section we review extant theory and policy 
on fragility. In the second section we identify an alternative framework for assessing 
fragility. In the third section we specify a model of fragility using a lead indicator 
approach, and in the fourth we test the model against measures of aid effectiveness. The 
fifth and final section concludes with directions for future research and implications for 
policy. 
Theory and policy on state fragility are poised to move beyond post-cold war 
‘first-generation’ perspectives, which tended to equate failure with armed conflict and 
institutional breakdown that occur as a result of war and intrastate struggle. These 
first-generation approaches focused on mono-causal explanations of state performance 
by giving credence to claims that failure and collapse were a function of political 
discord, open conflict between groups and the failure of state, and in some cases 
international institutions, to regulate armed conflict. The security-failure nexus was and 
still is seen in some respects as justification for a more concerted international effort to 
address the problems of state weakness whether through development assistance or the 
deployment of third parties to shore up or rebuild weak security institutions. The US 
National Security Strategy is an example of a policy specifically tailored to the 
problems of the security-failure nexus (NSS 2002). 11 September 2001 was 
fundamental to this way of thinking. Disengagement disappeared as an option as 
western nations in general, and the US in particular, came to equate their own national 
security with stability and order in the world’s poorest and poorest governed regions 
(McGillivray 2005). The goal would no longer be purely developmental, but also related 
to security at the local, regional, and global level as well. Further, first-generation 
analysis speaks of fragility as a process that conflict-ridden states either enter into as a 
result of institutional failure or emerge from, in those cases where a political accord has 
been reached and a peace process has been put in place.  
Such perspectives and policies are understandable, since the 1990s were witness to a 
number of catastrophic failures, including Bosnia, Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to 
name the most notable. Indeed, because the empirical evidence of this relatively short 
period in the history of state development suggested that the formation and collapse of 
states were very much driven by large-scale organized violence, first-generation 
research on state failure almost exclusively tended to equate failure with armed conflict.  
Not surprisingly, the policy options that emerged from this period tend to bifurcate into 
two camps. The first stresses the importance of the underlying or ‘root causes’ of state 
weakness as drivers of conflict, which in turn generate state failure; the second focuses 
on the competing agendas of state and non-state actors within the political and 
economic arena. In the former case, it has been suggested that poverty itself—defined in 
either absolute or relative terms—is a source of failure. In the latter case, the literature 
tends to focus on competing group agendas, whether driven by greed or legitimate 
grievances, as determinants of conflict.1 Key proponents of these perspectives include 
                                                 
1   As a result, since the end of the cold war, there have been several attempts to develop theoretical 
models (and empirical tests thereof) in order to explain state failure as a function of civil conflict. This 
literature has identified a number of causal mechanisms for civil wars including: environmental and 
demographic pressures (Homer-Dixon 1999; Diehl and Gleditsch 2001); greed versus grievance 
factors, where self-interest takes over justice-seeking behaviour; and the exploitation of natural 2 
Ignatieff (2002) who characterizes weak and collapsing states as the chief source of 
human rights abuses in the post-cold war world and James Wolfensohn (2002:  18), 
formerly of the World Bank, who calls for a global strategy that includes measures 
designed to address ‘the root causes of terrorism: those of economic exclusion, poverty 
and under-development’. The latter emphasizes the mutually reinforcing nature of 
poverty and state failure: weak governments deprive the poor of the basic means of 
survival even as the desperately poor are forced to engage in illicit conflictual activities 
such as drug production in order to survive (West 2005).  
By the same token, poverty by itself is not a good measure of fragility. Poverty is 
usually a symptom of a host of more fundamental causal factors related to a state’s 
authority, capacity and legitimacy. It is true that many failed and fragile states are poor 
but they also suffer from unequal distribution, poor service delivery,2 and weak 
governance, among many other problems.3 For example, the World Bank claims that a 
typical low-income country under stress (LICUS) has a GDP per capita roughly half that 
of a stable low income country.4 Similarly, Chauvet and Collier (2005) point out the 
negative effect that fragile states have on neighbouring countries, again illustrating the 
need to ground analysis in both a comparative and regional context, and not just in 
absolute terms. State fragility has important implications for aid allocation as well; for 
example, McGillivray (2007) finds that growth in fragile states would have been lower in 
the absence of aid to them, that they face larger absorptive capacity problems relative to 
other countries, and that they are also under-aided. A focus on the security-instability 
nexus is legitimate, of course, if the underlying purpose is to develop policies on armed 
conflict in the most egregious cases of failure. However, on their own they do not 
necessarily enhance our understanding of the causes of fragility and vulnerability, nor do 
they help us develop more effective policies. We make this argument for several reasons.  
First, when properly channelled, non-violent conflict is a normal facet of political and 
social life in all states. Organized large-scale violence, on the other hand, is a symptom 
rather than a cause of fragility. While it may be present in many failed and fragile states, 
not all of them experience large-scale violence. In fact, violent conflict is too narrow a 
lens through which to understand why states become fragile and why some fail. Further, 
                                                                                                                                               
resources to finance conflict (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Others such as Easterly and 
Levine (1997) point out the role of high levels of ethnic and religious fragmentation while Van Hear 
(1998) finds diasporas to have a high impact in the onset and course of a war. Such analyses of 
conflict can, to some extent, be transposed to an analysis of fragility because both internal wars and 
fragility are likely to be affected by (and affect) the economic, political and social environments. 
Furthermore both conflict and fragility result (implicitly or explicitly) from human interactions.  
2    Stewart and Brown (2007) employ the concept of ‘progressive service delivery’ as part of their 
definition of state fragility. In essence, states are considered fragile or failed if their service 
outcomes—rates of infant mortality, level of access to improved water, etc.—are substantially below 
the levels predicted by their income. Thus, some measure of country context is built into quantitative 
evaluation. 
3   These and other challenges are listed in the World Bank definition of low-income countries under 
stress (LICUS). See World Bank (2002).  
4   See for example, see World Bank’s fragile states briefing document (2005). 3 
from a policy perspective, when violence does occur it is usually too late to respond 
effectively except through costly operational responses such as military intervention.5  
2   Towards policy-relevant assessment of fragility 
Notwithstanding the fact that state fragility as a theoretical construct has now become 
an important part of the international political discourse, it nonetheless remains an 
elusive concept for both academics and policymakers.6 There are a number of 
interpretations of state fragility, all of which appear to some extent in the international 
lexicon. Variously characterized as difficult partners (OECD 2001), difficult 
environments (Torres and Anderson (2004), collapsed states (Goldstone et al. 2000), 
LICUS (World Bank 2002), poor performers (AusAID 2002), weak performers (ADB 
2004), failing and/or failed states (Rotberg 2004), and countries at risk of instability 
(PM’s Strategy Unit), the concept encompasses a number of partially overlapping, yet 
analytically distinct concepts regarding vulnerability. Regarding definitional issues, the 
OECD, for instance, defines fragile states as ‘countries where there is a lack of political 
commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies’ 
(Morcos 2005; Prest, Gazo and Carment 2005). The World Bank, on the other hand, 
focuses on some thirty LICUS that are characterized by very weak policies, institutions 
and governance and that comprise about half a billion inhabitants.  
USAID (2005) reports that about a third of the world’s population now lives in areas 
that are fragile. In order for interventions (through development assistance or otherwise) 
to have a measurable and positive impact on fragile states, it is first necessary to 
understand how states become fragile and why, and a first attempt at this would be in 
the form of a retrospective look at one particular point in time. This is in our view an 
important exercise given the recent findings by Chauvet and Collier (2005) that the cost 
of countries falling into LICUS status is extremely high, not only for themselves, but 
also for their neighbours. According to a French government report: 
                                                 
5  This is not to suggest that analysts and policy makers would be unwise to focus on the all important 
security dimensions. We know that fragile and failed states constitute a security risk in a number of 
important ways. First, they are a risk to their people because they lack capacity, resulting in a lack of 
basic security. They lack governance, resulting in the inefficient and inequitable distribution of public 
goods; and they lack control over violence within their territory, resulting in further division and 
weakness, and the diffusion of conflict into new jurisdictions. Failed and fragile states are also vectors 
for transnational threats and global problems: they lack capacity to prevent the transmission of 
diseases such as avian flu; they are unable to control the transmission of AIDS; they host base-camps 
for transnational criminal networks; their weak border control provides opportunities for human and 
drug trafficking, along with other forms of smuggling; and their internal conflicts create refugee flows 
that upset the demographic balance of neighbouring states. Finally, failed and fragile states are 
regional and international risks because they are more likely to engage in risky behaviour in violation 
of international laws, rules and principles; they provide support for the diffusion of weapons of mass 
destruction; they engage in hostile interactions with their neighbours; their weakness attracts foreign 
intervention; and their diaspora groups may become conduits of conflict diffusion and contagion. 
6   Though we do use subgroups of the top 40 or top 60 fragile states as part of our empirical analysis, we 
do in general not focus on a set number of fragile states; instead we identify state fragility as being 
primarily a question of degree, rather than of kind. While some countries are in fact failing or failed, 
in general aspects of fragility can be identified in virtually all states. 4 
The situation of a ‘fragile state’ is assessed in negative terms, on the basis of 
two main criteria: (1) poor economic performance (the 46 fragile states listed 
in the paper are all low-income countries, and most of them are among the less 
developed countries [LDCs]); (2) the effective impotence of government (the 
DFID paper refers to the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment [CPIA] ranking)7. Another approach to the same problem is to use 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the point of reference, in order 
to underscore the fact that ‘fragile states’ are in fact those where the MDGs 
will not be achieved, or to highlight deficiencies in service delivery to the 
population. The degree of ‘fragility’ is defined according to a few simple 
criteria (the rule of law, control over the country’s territory, respect for 
minorities, delivery of basic services), used exclusively within the national 
context. Such definitions pay little attention to the country’s external 
vulnerability or the harmful consequences of certain policies of the developed 
countries or large private-sector firms. The ‘fragile states’ approach does, 
however, allow for the inclusion of the notion of preventive action, whereas 
previously the conceptual debate had been restricted to countries emerging 
from crisis or in post-conflict situations (Châtaigner and Gaulme 2006). 
Focusing on development issues, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) defines fragile states as ‘countries where there is a lack of 
political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor 
policies’ (Morcos 2005). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
defines state weakness in broadly similar terms, focusing on states in which ‘the 
government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, 
including the poor’ (DFID 2005). 
As noted above, because of links being made between poverty, conflict and global 
terrorism, donors have in recent years paid more attention to fragile states; despite 
disagreements regarding what a fragile state is, recent research has provided a number 
of findings. First, there are many states that would qualify as ‘fragile’, ‘failed’, ‘failing’, 
or LICUS; attempts to draw up a specific list normally end up with between 30 and 50 
countries. Second, as reported by Chauvet and Collier (2005), the cost of disengagement 
from such states can be extremely high, proving more harmful in the long term to 
international peace and security than continued engagement. Third, many donor 
governments now believe that outside involvement must be coordinated at the strategic 
level.8 
Accordingly, there have been some attempts to reach a level of consensus on issues of 
vital importance to programming in failed and fragile states. The first area of consensus 
is that preliminary analyses must draw on the widest range of structural indicators (see 
Table 1A). To focus on a single factor such as governance, conflict or resources is to 
invite incomplete analysis of the problem, and ineffective engagement as a result. 
                                                 
7  The CPIA ranking is an aggregate quantitative indicator of the quality of macroeconomic 
management, of the government and public sector, and of structural and poverty-reduction policies. It 
is criticized, however, for its static nature, its failure to take structural handicaps into account and its 
connection with the Washington consensus (Severino and Charnoz 2005). 
8  Such efforts received official support as part of the Paris Declaration, produced by the OECD in 2005. 
See OECD (2005) 5 
Structural performance measures are necessary to provide a basis for cross-state 
comparison in order to monitor, gauge and evaluate state performance at the strategic 
level; such comparative tools are a prerequisite of informed and rational allocation of 
limited engagement resources. 
Second, programming must be grounded in an ongoing process of risk assessment and 
monitoring. Such tools must be able to identify countries at risk and provide guidance as 
to the type of engagement required. Monitoring must provide a risk analysis to allow for 
policy deliberation and resource mobilization, vital prerequisites of timely and effective 
engagement. Even more than in other developing economies, a thorough understanding 
of context in fragile states is a prerequisite of effective and properly sequenced 
engagement; context is necessary to ensure that we understand the causal factors driving 
stakeholder behaviour, and changes in incentive structure necessary to produce positive 
outcomes.  
One crucial assumption we make is that fragile states show strengths and vulnerabilities 
in one or more areas based on the idea that all states possess three fundamental 
components of ‘stateness’, namely authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC)   
(Carment et al. 2006a). Weakness along one or more of these dimensions will impact on 
the overall fragility of a particular country. Authority refers to the ability of the state to 
enact binding legislation over its population and to provide the latter with a stable and 
safe environment. Legitimacy refers to the ability of the state to command public loyalty 
to the governing regime and to generate domestic support for government legislation 
being passed and policies being implemented. Capacity refers to the power of the state 
to mobilize public resources for productive uses (see Table 1A). As conceptualized in 
our research, capacity is in some ways similar to the focus on progressive service 
delivery suggested by Stewart and Brown (2007). However, the latter brings in elements 
of state authority, in that it attempts to capture not only the resources available to the 
state, but also the government’s willingness to devote those resources to the delivery of 
essential services. In this sense, progressive service delivery as an evaluative concept is 
reminiscent of DFID’s focus on state ‘willingness’ to pursue pro-poor outcomes, 
described in its fragile states strategy (DFID 2005).  
Our argument is that, states become fragile and fail for different reasons. The capacity 
problems that beset the fragile states of Sub-Sahara Africa are distinct from the 
legitimacy and authority problems of the fragile states of Central and South Asia. For 
example, in our country rankings, Pakistan and Sri Lanka exhibit poor performance on 
measures of authority and legitimacy while middle performers in Africa such as Ghana, 
Kenya and Tanzania are faced with capacity problems (Table 1A). Of course those that 
show up repeatedly at the top of our rankings are those that face challenges in all three 
categories.  
Since 2005 the Country Indicators for Fragility Project9 has been conducting a second-
generation analysis of fragile states, developing a methodology that combines dynamic 
event and stakeholder analysis with statistical information to produce context-rich 
country assessments that are nonetheless still comparable against the performance of 
                                                 
9   Since 1997, the CIFP project (together with the Canadian government, private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations) has collected statistical information on a range of issues related to the 
political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.  6 
peers. The analysis begins with a structural profile of the country, a composite index 
that measures overall country fragility along six dimensions or clusters: governance, 
economics, security, human development, demography and environment. Each of these 
clusters is based on a number of indicators; for example, indicators under the 
‘economics cluster’ include economic growth, gross domestic product (GDP), inflation 
and unemployment, among others. The data are further analysed to provide insight into 
relative state strength and weakness along the three dimensions of ‘stateness’ referred to 
above, namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This multidimensional assessment 
methodology is a direct response to the multicausal nature of fragility and failure; states 
can weaken in any number of ways, such that any attempt to attribute fragility to a 
single deterministic set of causal variables inevitably remains underdetermined, 
capturing only a limited subset of all fragile states. Instead, CIFP adopts a more 
inductive approach, identifying areas of relative strength and weakness across all 
measures of state performance. It is this inductive and multifaceted approach to fragility 
and failure that distinguishes CIFP’s country database from conflict-driven first-
generation projects such as the Fund for Peace failed states project. 
Like its predecessor, the open-source CIFP conflict risk index (www.carleton.ca/cifp), 
the fragility index produced in collaboration with CIDA, employs a methodology of 
relative assessment. In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are 
distributed across a nine-point index. The best performing state receives a score of one, 
the worst a score of nine, and the rest continuously distributed between these two 
extremes based on relative performance. As country performance for some types of data 
can vary significantly from year to year—as in the case of economic shocks, natural 
disasters, and other externalities—averages are taken for global rank scores over a   
5-year time frame.  
North Korea provides an intriguing example of how second-generation analysis can 
produce results that are both more intuitively satisfying and more useful to 
policymakers than those emerging from a simple indexing exercise. In the 2007 CIFP 
fragility index (see Tables 8A and 9A), North Korea is ranked 52nd overall. However, 
when fragility is measured on the any one of the ALC dimensions, a much more 
nuanced picture emerges. Balanced against middling rankings for both authority and 
capacity is an extremely weak legitimacy score; North Korea ranks as the third most 
fragile state in term of legitimacy. Given North Korea’s current status as international 
pariah, such a finding has a high level of intuitive appeal. With its low level of 
legitimacy, the regime might be termed brittle—endowed with sufficient authority and 
capacity to maintain control of state borders and territory, but highly vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks. The result thus conveys more useful information than a simple rank 
ordering of states according to the level of development, or presence of conflict 
inducing factors, providing a springboard to further discussion of policy options 
available to the international community.  
Table 1A in the Appendix provides a list of the top 40 fragile states based on data for 
the period 1999 to 2006, with Burundi being the most fragile state. The table provides 
data for the overall fragility score, scores along the ALC components, scores for the 
different indicator clusters, with gender as a cross-cutting theme. What is striking in 
examining the most fragile states is that though they appear in more than one category 
they rarely rank high on all three, an indication that fragility manifests itself in different 
forms that require different forms of intervention. When broken down in terms of the 
six indicator clusters (e.g., for the top 20 fragile states), none appear on all six and only 7 
a few appear on four, again an indication that fragile states face different challenges 
which the one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to resolve. 
3  Methodology and empirical results 
The lack of a clear and universally accepted definition of fragility speaks to its 
multifaceted nature. Despite the utility of the fragility matrix for programming purposes 
it stands to reason that not all indicators are necessary for econometric analysis. Thus, in 
this section, we seek to answer the question: of those indicators commonly associated 
with fragility which ones provide the best predictive power?  
To answer this question, the fragility index, which will be our dependent variable in the 
empirical analysis, is a simple average of each of the six indicator clusters listed in 
Table 1A. The individual indicators used to calculate each indicator cluster are assigned 
a score on a 9-point scale (1 to 9). More precisely, the global sample of countries is 
ranked from highest to lowest level of performance, divided into nine equal groups, and 
then assigned scores ranging from 1 to 9 for each indicator based on their rank position 
within the sample. In general, a higher score (7 to 9) indicates that the country is 
performing poorly relative to others while a lower score (1 to 3) indicates that the 
country is performing well relative to other countries. Given that relative country 
performance can vary from one year to another, global rank scores are averaged over a 
few years (up to a maximum of five years, given data availability) to mitigate against 
picking an unrepresentative year. These global rank scores are further adjusted with 
modifiers in the form of trend and volatility scores. The trend score (based on 
short-term, 5-year, trends) is calculated from an ideal linear least squares regression line 
where the slope of the trend line (+1 for positive slope, -1 for negative slope, and 0 for 
zero slope) is used as a measure of the direction of change over time. Although trend 
scores are helpful in assessing whether an indicator is changing over the short term, they 
do not tell us anything about the degree of variation in country performance. A volatility 
score in the form of a qualitative assessment of the degree of volatility (deviation of 
actual trend from the ideal linear trend over a 5-year time period) is used to modify the 
base scale (adding a value of 2 to be base scale if volatility is high, 1 if volatility is 
moderate, and nothing if there is little or no volatility). 
As a first step, we identified leading indicators from each of the indicator clusters listed 
in Table 1A through bivariate correlations in order to arrive at a parsimonious 
multivariate model of state fragility. For example, in the case of the economics cluster, 
we tested a number of indicators (GDP, GDP per capita, economic growth, inflation, 
inequality, unemployment, etc.) individually against the economics index, and chose the 
one with higher explanatory power, and also making sure not to choose independent 
variables that are highly correlated with each other (for example, GDP per capita and 
GDP). This ‘leading indicator’ approach was applied to each of the six clusters as well 
as the cross-cutting theme of gender in order to come up with a realistic model that 
would not exhaust too many degrees of freedom. This leading indicators approach 
allows us to estimate a baseline model that takes the following form: 
i i i i i i trade demo growth income fragility ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
where the different variables are operationalized as follows: 8 
–   fragility is the CIFP fragility index described in the previous section, with only 
countries with a fragility score of 4 and above being considered. Excluded 
countries are essentially OECD countries as well as a few high-income countries 
such as Singapore and South Korea. This variable is further operationalized as a 
categorical variable in which countries considered fragile (top 40 or top 60, for 
example) are coded as ‘1’ and the rest ‘0’ in order to conduct logit estimation 
(more on this below). The independent variables include: ‘income’, which is 
captured by the logarithm of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP);  
–   growth refers to the growth of GDP per capita; 
–  demo refers to the level of democracy from the Polity IV dataset and it varies 
from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic (+10);  
–   trade refers to trade openness, namely the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP. Subscript ‘i’ refers to countries and εi is the normal disturbance 
or error term with the usual properties. 
This baseline model is thus controlling for economic (internal and external) factors and 
political factors as hypothesized in the theoretical literature. Since there are no direct 
formal models of state fragility, our approach is a purely statistical one in the sense that in 
identifying lead indicators we are trying to find the best statistical model to fit the 
available data (a procedure which is analogous to the Hendry School, or LSE/British 
Econometrics, where one ‘tests down’ in order to obtain a parsimonious model). This also 
allows us to move away from explanations or theories that rely on a single variable to a 
more realistic multivariate approach that controls for the effects of different variables. 
Obviously, in doing so, we are getting rid of several indicators that feed into our 
conceptualization of state fragility through the ALC framework but as a result we also 
obtain a parsimonious and testable model that can be helpful for policy implementation.  
As mentioned above, in addition to using the fragility index in its ‘raw form’, we also 
operationalize it as a binary dependent variable (‘fragility’ versus ‘no fragility’) and this 
allows us to use logistic regression analysis. The sample of countries being analysed 
consists of a maximum of 156 countries with a five-year average of most recent data 
until 2005. In addition to the variables of our baseline model, squared terms for 
democracy and trade are included in different specifications of the baseline model to 







observations Mean  Median 
Standard 
deviation 
    
ETHDIV*  Ethnic  diversity  128 0.39 0.42 0.26 
ETHRISK*  Risk of rebellion  98  4.84  3.77  3.86 
FRG  Fragility  index  156 5.89 5.80 1.06 
GDPG  Economic  growth  148 3.46 3.56 3.11 
HDI HDI    148 0.65 0.72 0.16 
HREM  Human rights – empowerment  154 5.32 6.00 3.07 
LDEM  Level of democracy  129  1.77  4.00  6.40 
PPP  GDP per capita  134  5031  3867  4552 
TRAD  Trade openness (% of GDP)  141  83.18  75.38  37.71 
Note:  * single measures 9 
for different regions were also added to the baseline model, as well as other variables 
that appear in the literature such as the human rights empowerment index, the human 
development index (HDI) and ethnic diversity and ethnic risk. Even though the latter 
variables did not show up as leading indicators, they are included in order to test some 
of the common causal factors identified in the conflict and fragility literature. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis, 
arranged in alphabetical order. We have data for more than 100 countries for most of the 
variables. The average value of the fragility index is within the range of countries 
performing around the median value. Except for GDP per capita, the mean and median 
values are not too different and the standard deviations are not too large for the other 
variables; in the case of GDP per capita, the log transform of the variable will be 
considered in the regression analysis in order to normalize the distribution. 
Table 4A in the Appendix shows the results when the benchmark Equation (1), and 
different specifications based on the latter, are estimated using OLS for all countries 
with a fragility index of 4 and above. These different specifications provide tests of 
hypotheses regarding state fragility from the extant literature (as mentioned in the 
introduction) and also perform some sensitivity analysis by using different variables that 
capture similar effects. The level of development of a country, measured by the 
logarithm of GDP per capita is highly significant and with the expected sign in 
Column (1), which is the benchmark Equation (1); poorer countries tend to be more 
fragile than richer countries on average. In Column (6), we replaced the level of 
development with a broader measure of development, namely HDI and once again 
obtained the same result; different specifications did not change the result either as seen 
in the other columns of Table 4A.  
The other variables, namely growth, the level of democracy and trade openness are also 
significant and with the expected signs. Over the estimated period, countries that grew 
faster tended to be less fragile, democratic countries displayed less fragility, and 
countries that are more open to trade also tended to be less fragile. The possibility that 
the relationships were non-linear (as alluded to in the Briefing Note to the Canadian 
Government by Carment et al. 2006b based on simple correlations) was also 
investigated by adding square terms for the level of democracy, trade openness and the 
human rights empowerment index. This relationship was confirmed in the case of   
the level of democracy only but not in the case of trade or human rights. More precisely, 
the inverted ‘U’ relationship that several authors have uncovered between conflict and 
regime type is confirmed in the case of our fragility index. In Column (4), when the 
human rights empowerment index is considered, it is highly significant with a negative 
sign when included on its own, indicating that countries with better human rights 
records tend to be less fragile. Finally, both variables for ethnic risk and ethnic diversity 
are significant and positively correlated with fragility (even though we have fewer 
observations in those cases). The overall fit of the estimated equations is greater than 
80% in all cases, and the dummy variable for Africa was significant in most of the 
specifications (not surprisingly given that many of the fragile countries in our sample 
tend to be from that region- see Table 1A in the Appendix). 
In order to see whether the results discussed in the previous paragraph hold for different 
samples, we restricted our sample to countries with fragility scores of 6 and above. The 
results are shown in Table 5A in the Appendix. Even though the overall fit of the 
equations was lower, the signs and significance of the independent variables did not 10 
change very much. The level of development and the level of democracy remained 
highly significant and with the same signs as in Table 4A. The human development 
index remained significant when used instead of GDP per capita, and both ethnic risk 
and ethnic diversity remained significant and positive. The only major difference 
between these sets of results and the ones in Table 4A is that trade openness is no longer 
significant, reflecting the fact that the most fragile countries tend to trade less in general. 
It is also interesting to note that in some specifications using the new sample of 
countries with fragility scores of 6 and above that growth is not always significant. The 
fact that growth does not always have a positive impact on fragility in the most fragile 
countries could be due to a number of reasons, namely that fragile countries do not have 
high growth rates to begin with, that any growth that does occur is not being distributed 
throughout the economy, or that growth, due to its long-term nature, is not being 
reflected enough during the time period considered. 
As discussed earlier, we also considered a dichotomized version of our dependent 
variable where countries are assigned a ‘1’ if they are fragile and a ‘0’ if they are not. 
We considered two versions of this variable, namely the top 40 and the top 60 fragile 
countries (where the latter were assigned ‘1’ and the remaining countries ‘0’ 
accordingly). While this may seem arbitrary, our objective was essentially to see 
whether the results reported and discussed above would be significantly different. Given 
that the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression analysis using maximum 
likelihood estimation is used and results are reported in Tables 6A and 7A in the 
Appendix.10 In the case where the top 40 fragile countries in our sample are coded as 
‘1’ (see Table 6A), the level of development measured by the logarithm of GDP per 
capita, the level of democracy, trade openness and growth remained significant in most 
of the regressions, confirming the results obtained earlier. The main difference, 
however, was that the non-linearity observed in the case of democracy, as well as the 
significance of ethnic diversity, both disappeared with logit estimates. The dummy 
variable for Africa was also not as significant as previously observed. When the top 60 
fragile states in our sample are coded as ‘1’ (see Table 7A), most of the results obtained 
in the previous tables were confirmed. The only major exception was the insignificance 
of the democracy variable reflecting the fact that the level of democracy matters more 
for the most fragile countries. 
Problems with regressions such as the ones reported in Tables 4A and 5A (and making 
causal inferences from them) may be due to omitted variables, reverse causality 
(endogeneity) or measurement errors.11 Given that we used leading indicators and that 
we are using the existing data at our disposal, we are already mitigating against the 
possibility of omitted variables or measurement errors. Reverse causality remains, 
however, a possibility that needs to be investigated further. Indeed, it is quite possible in 
our case that state fragility influences a country’s GDP per capita, growth, its political 
(regime) type or even the degree to which it trades with the rest of the world. To 
mitigate against this problem, we regressed lagged values (by five years) of our 
independent variables on the fragility index and this did not change the results. 
However, the potential for reverse causality still remains and given that OLS estimates 
                                                 
10  In fact, both logit and probit estimation are possible but there is really no compelling argument for 
choosing one over the other (see, for example, Gujarati 2003 for a discussion).  
11  All of these terms lead to the same econometric problem, namely that the independent variables are 
contemporaneously correlated with the error term. 11 
are biased in its presence, the standard approach to deal with this problem is 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation. 
The choice of good instruments is extremely important and must fulfil two conditions. 
First, they must be correlated with the independent variables; second, they must not be 
correlated with the error term. We used the five-year lagged values of the independent 
variables as instruments (when they were available) since there is no correlation 
between their lagged values and the error term. The main finding from IV estimation 
(results not reported here but available from the authors) was that the level of 
development remained a significant factor in explaining fragility, whereas the other 
independent variables did not. The quality of instruments used was also checked by 
regressing the residuals from Equation (1) on the instrumental variables, and none of the 
instruments was found to be significant. To summarize, therefore, the results from this 
section, based on OLS and MLE (logit) estimates, indicate that state fragility is the 
result of a myriad of factors, of which the level of development, measured by per capita 
GDP, seems to be more important (even when endogeneity is taken into account). Given 
the likelihood of endogeneity in our estimates, some of these factors might be symptoms 
as well as causes of fragility. 
4  Aid policy and fragility 
As important as it is to develop a clearer understanding of the determinants of fragility, 
it is only one part of the puzzle. Equally important is to develop an understanding of 
how fragility affects aid allocation and aid effectiveness. Having identified the lead 
indicators associated with fragility in the previous section, we turn now to the latter 
question of aid effectiveness in fragile states. As others have previously formally tested 
aid effectiveness in fragile states (as in for example, McGillivray 2007), we do not 
repeat such a procedure here. Instead, we use the insights gathered from the previous 
section (namely the identification of leading causes of fragility) together with the ALC 
framework and events-based monitoring developed by CIFP to discuss aid policy and 
state fragility. Prior to Burnside and Dollar’s (1997, 2000) seminal (and controversial) 
contribution to the literature on aid and growth, a number of empirical studies find that 
aid did not contribute to growth (see, for example, Mosley 1980; Boone 1996). Bauer 
(1981) is even more critical, arguing that one could not force countries to grow by just 
injecting money when the right incentives and institutions were missing. What was also 
surprising was that while projects seemed to yield expected results, the macro evidence 
was not very positive, hence the so-called micro-macro paradox described by Mosley 
(1986). Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) show that aid works in good policy 
environments (meaning that it does not in fragile state ones) and their views continue to 
receive broad support despite attacks by Easterly (2003) that the Burnside-Dollar 
argument is not robust when new data or alternative definitions are considered. Other 
surveys of the literature by Hansen and Tarp (2000) for example, are more positive and 
argue that aid leads to increases in growth, regardless of the policy environment (see 
also Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 2004), effectively nullifying the micro-macro 
paradox of aid. Other than its impact (or lack thereof) on growth, critics of aid have also 
cited fungibility, lack of donor coordination, too much tying of aid, lack of absorptive 
capacity and the failure of conditionality to buy reforms, among other factors 
determining aid effectiveness.  12 
When considered together, the Burnside-Dollar argument that aid works in good policy 
environments and concurrent findings that neglecting fragile countries may in fact 
worsen poverty and lead to a further weakening of the state pose a dilemma for 
policymakers and analysts alike.12 When making decisions on where and how to 
allocate aid, should they be sensitive to fragile state environments or not? Tables 2 and 
3 show how the pattern of aid differs from fragile states and all aid recipients, based on 
OECD-DAC statistics. When measured in terms of aid per capita, our calculations based 
on data from the OEDC-DAC indicate that fragile states are under-funded relative to the 
overall sample and the volatility of aid flows has also increased over time. Furthermore, 
aid as a percentage of gross national income has not changed significantly (except for 
the period 1969-78), indicating that fragile countries continue to be aid dependent.13 
Table 2  
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Source:   Authors’ calculations based on OECD-DAC aid statistics, and the CIFP 2007 Fragile States 
Index. 
                                                 
12  Chauvet and Collier (2005) estimate the cost of a country falling into LICUS status to be US$ 80 
billion on average, where most of the cost is borne by neighbouring countries. 
13  It is important to realize that the table assumes that the top 40 or 20 fragile states were the same over 
the whole period but that the fragility index used to rank countries is for the last five years up until 
2005. Further, McGillivray (2007) also finds that fragile states are under-aided.  13 
Tables 2 and 3 also show how aid flows change when considering states with specific 
sources of weakness—namely, weakness in authority, legitimacy, or capacity. Though 
the general pattern still holds that fragile states receive reduced per capita funding when 
compared to all aid recipients, additional trends emerge. States with weak authority and 
legitimacy consistently received lower amounts of aid per capita than states lacking 
capacity. Even more interesting, the relative levels of aid to states lacking authority and 
legitimacy appeared to have shifted over time, a finding that holds for analyses done on 
both the top 20 and top 40 fragile states in each area. While states with weak authority 
received less aid per capita than states lacking legitimacy in the periods 1969-78 and 
1979-88, flows approached parity during 1989-93; since then, states lacking in authority 
have received higher levels of aid than those lacking legitimacy. Indeed, aid flows to 
states lacking legitimacy have remained relatively stagnant since the early 1980s. 
Clearly, such findings are in large measure a reflection on global trends occurring 
during the period of observation. The end of the cold war and attempts to contain or 
control civil conflict throughout the 1990s likely both play a role in the evolution in 
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Source:   Authors’ calculations based on OECD-DAC aid statistics, and the CIFP 2007 Fragile States 
Index. 14 
Table 3 highlights the variation in aid allocation as a percentage of state GNI. When 
compared with all aid recipients, fragile states on average remain more aid dependent 
than all aid recipients, though not significantly so. States lacking in capacity are 
considerably more aid dependent than other types of fragile states—in the latter three 
observation periods, low-capacity states on average relied on aid flows for more than 20 
per cent of their GNI, a figure that held for both the top 20 and top 40 states. 
If one were to follow selectivity (that is, rewarding countries with good policies with 
increased aid since they can presumably use it more effectively) this would work 
against fragile states which in all likelihood lack the right policies to begin with. The 
Collier-Dollar selectivity model (2002), which builds on the Burnside-Dollar result does 
just that, namely allocate aid to poor countries with good policies instead of funding 
reforms, with poverty reduction as the main criterion. Collier and Dollar (2002) derived 
poverty-efficient aid allocations, where aid is allocated in such a way as to maximize 
the number of people that are lifted out of poverty. According to their model, poverty-
efficient aid will be higher when poverty is higher, per capita income is lower, and the 
policy environment is better. However, the main argument for aid selectivity rests on 
the idea that aid effectiveness depends on the policy environment, being based on 
Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000), and it ignores other factors such as history of past 
conflicts, the level of democracy or political regime type. We have in fact seen in the 
previous section that many factors potentially impact on fragility. Once these factors are 
taken into account, fragile states might end up with more aid than the selectivity model 
in its purest form would provide them. Obviously, policymakers need to be also aware 
of diminishing returns to aid (or what is better known as limited absorptive capacities) 
as examined in several aid-growth empirical studies. 
Even if we were to assume that aid can and does have a positive impact, one needs to 
think about the forms of intervention that can take place in fragile states, beyond just  
 
Figure 1 












0.0  5.0  10.0  15.0  20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0  45.0


























Source:  OECD-DAC aid statistics and CIFP Fragile States Index. 15 
increasing funding. We believe that the ALC framework can serve as a point of 
departure to think about the types of intervention that need to take place (for example, 
programme versus project lending, targeting poverty versus governance, or looking at 
absorptive capacities, etc.). As argued earlier (see Table 1A in the Appendix), 
examining fragility in terms of the ALC framework (or the different indicator clusters) 
for, let us say, the top 20 fragile states, the latter do not always show up at the top of all 
these categories. The fact that the most fragile countries rank differently in terms of 
their ALC components, correlations among the elements notwithstanding, is an 
indication that certain areas need to be emphasized more than others. Lack of capacity 
on the part of the state, which is confirmed by the empirical investigation in section 3, 
seems to be important. However, to the extent that this may be correlated with the other 
components, namely authority and legitimacy, and given that the data show that some 
countries are more deficient in those sectors, aid focusing more directly on governance 
or corruption may be more helpful, for example, than direct attacks on poverty. It is also 
important to note that the general results (or shortcomings) from the literature and 
experience of the last 50 years as to why aid has not yielded expected results such as the 
lack of enforcement of conditionality, the failure of aid to ‘buy’ reforms, the volatility 
of aid flows, lack of absorptive capacity, and fungibility can all be examined using the 
ALC framework as a point of departure.   
To provide sectoral and operational guidance, CIFP adds further dynamic elements to 
the analysis, thereby providing the contextual component necessary for true ‘second 
generation’ fragile state analysis. Events data, external and internal stakeholder analysis, 
and scenario generation all combine to provide context necessary to understand the 
dynamic elements of state performance. Such analysis would seek to uncover   
and highlight for policymakers the emergent trends within a given state (both positive 
and negative), identify how actors and stakeholders might react to such developments, 
and provide an evaluation of the possible consequences for policy and programming 
initiatives in the country. These dynamic data, when combined with initial structural 
findings, provide an assessment of both the underlying conditions and recent 
developments in a given country, thereby informing a more nuanced and ultimately 
more policy-relevant analysis of state fragility. 
The following figures provide examples of the type of output that CIFP produces as part 
of its fragile state analysis, both taken from a recent fragility report on Colombia 
(Wyjad 2007). Figure 2 compares Colombia’s ALC footprint to the regional average; as 
one might expect, the country suffers a gap in its level of authority as a result of long 
running conflict and the government’s inability to exercise control over its territory and 
borders. State legitimacy and capacity remain comparable to regional averages however, 
providing numerous entry points to international actors.  
Figure 3 combines structural and event data at the sectoral level. The overall level of 
risk is determined using CIFP’s structural database, while the event barometers are 
produced using observations collected over a six month period extending from 
September 2006 to February 2007. As part of its events analysis, CIFP observes and 
analyses all events reported on a given country from a variety of information sources—
both domestic and international—over a given period, and uses that information to 
further the understanding of emerging trends in the country. The barometer indicates 
both the average score of events during the period, both aggregately and broken down 
by sector, as well as the event trend line for each cluster, defined as the slope of the 
ordinary least squares regression line of the weekly event average over the full 16 
observation period. Put simply, the arrow indicates whether events tended to become 
increasingly stabilizing or destabilizing over the period observed. In the case of security 
and crime, the news was bad and getting worse; in economics and human development 
the news was good and getting better; while in governance the status quo persisted. 
When combined with structural data, the resulting analysis provides a generally 
comparable, yet contextualized portrait of a given state’s fragility. 
Figure 2 
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Once analysis is complete, the CIFP state fragility assessment framework feeds into 
policy analysis at both the strategic and operational level. Strategically, such 
assessments allow policymakers to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a given 
state, specify entry points where the international community might profitably direct its 
energy and resources, and provide a metric with which to measure fragile state 
performance over time in comparison to itself and others. ‘second-generation’ analysis 
thus seeks to answer the following questions for policymakers:  
–  What are the priority countries?  
–  Where can the international community respond most effectively?  
–  Which department(s) should lead/contribute to the response? How should 
resources be allocated?  
At the operational level, second-generation analysis provides a monitoring capability 
that informs operational goal-setting and measure policy effectiveness. Typical 
questions at the operational level include:  
–  Where/what are the primary sources of instability?  
–  How do recent events/trends affect policy formation and implementation?  
–  Are policies having an impact?  
Though both sets of questions may be answered using the same basic data, they require 
substantively different approaches to analysis. 
5  Conclusion and policy recommendations 
After more than 50 years of development assistance and experience, there is now an 
abundance of literature that has examined the effectiveness of development assistance at 
the macro level for all aid recipients. The literature on aid effectiveness in fragile states, 
and on the determinants of fragility, is comparatively much smaller, and deserves, in our 
view, further scrutiny. In this paper we examined the determinants of state fragility by 
redefining the latter term around the notions of authority, legitimacy and capacity of 
states. While the cross-sectional analysis undertaken in this paper yields interesting 
results, it is our view that the search for better instruments to account for endogeneity, 
as well as the use of panel data (controlling for country effects and the time dimension) 
will shed further light on this issue. As far as the estimates reported in this paper are 
concerned, it appears that the main drivers of fragility are a combination of a myriad of 
factors (both economic and political) beyond conflict and economic dimensions. We 
also examined the question of aid allocation to fragile states, basing ourselves on the 
empirical findings, the literature on aid selectivity, and the ALC framework, arguing 
that the latter could serve as a point of departure for policymakers and analysts by 
identifying country-specific patterns. The main issue is how to make aid more effective 
in fragile states. 
 18 
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Appendix 
Table 1A 
CIFP’s top 40 fragile states, 2006 ranking 
 ALC  scores 
 Cross-
cutting
































































































































Burundi 8.25  8.04 7.58 8.65 7.42 7.18 8.08 9.17 8.89 7.25 8.00
Congo (Kinshasa)  8.11  7.93 7.58 8.49 7.72 7.67 6.93 9.15 9.70 7.35 5.47
Afghanistan 7.89  9.06 8.42 6.68 – 9.56 6.00 9.53 7.78 7.57 4.33
Somalia 7.86  7.53 8.41 7.82 –  8.90 8.42 7.18 8.51 7.34 7.13
Liberia 7.84  6.18 8.82 8.64 8.52 9.22 7.58 7.20 8.91 6.78 5.40
Chad 7.81  6.79 8.13 8.43 9.33  7.96 7.04 6.89 9.83 7.57 4.87
Ethiopia 7.81  7.58 7.14 8.31 7.47 6.59 7.44 8.07 8.83 8.35 6.40
Côte d’Ivoire  7.79  7.74 7.89 7.79 8.51 7.83 7.09 7.46 8.64 8.15 6.40
Angola 7.73  7.98 7.66 7.55 6.62 7.62 7.21 7.88 9.28 7.58 4.00
Eritrea 7.73  7.04 7.91 8.14 7.00 6.93 7.45 7.68 9.02 7.49 6.07
Haiti 7.72  6.81 8.53 7.94 7.27 8.32 7.24 8.05 7.95 6.90 7.67
Kenya 7.60  7.46 7.68 7.66 8.60 7.32 7.25 6.98 8.40 8.30 6.67
Rwanda 7.55  6.27 7.47 8.51 6.42 6.93 6.74 6.47 8.69 8.43 8.20
Zimbabwe 7.54  6.77 8.33 7.76 7.62 7.49 8.21 6.79 8.40 6.05 6.27
Guinea-Bissau 7.52  6.66 7.42 8.25 8.38 6.93 8.11 5.43 8.60 8.40 4.67
Sierra Leone  7.50  6.55 7.22 8.46 7.60 7.38 8.18 5.70 8.46 7.33 6.00
Congo (Braz.)  7.49  6.70 7.57 8.02 7.06 7.68 7.47 6.69 8.17 8.23 4.20
Sudan 7.48  7.83 7.58 7.21 7.82 7.13 6.38 9.22 8.22 6.95 6.00
West Bank/Gaza  7.41  6.69 10.33 7.50 8.30 6.85 9.08 8.16 4.78 7.00 9.00
Nepal 7.37  6.58 7.76 7.71 7.42 7.63 6.69 8.28 7.73 7.34 6.00
Nigeria 7.33  7.19 7.46 7.37 7.64 7.19 6.65 7.02 8.08 8.30 6.67
Niger 7.28  5.61 7.09 8.63 9.07 6.92 7.58 3.22 9.16 7.70 6.67
Yemen 7.27  6.59 8.32 7.31 8.93 8.00 6.56 7.44 7.20 7.63 8.33
Uganda 7.24  7.38 6.50 7.51 5.33 6.51 6.11 7.38 8.27 8.95 6.67
Central Afr. Rep.  7.17 5.47 8.19 7.97 8.33  7.91 7.49 4.96 8.58 7.23 2.67
Mauritania 7.16  5.99 7.81 7.69 9.34 7.64 6.89 5.67 8.23 6.68 6.93
Guinea 7.15  5.97 7.56 7.92 7.40 7.40 7.36 4.87 8.94 6.90 4.93
Burkina Faso  7.00  5.50 6.39 8.28 7.90 5.61 7.16 3.25 8.94 8.40 5.00
Iraq 6.94  7.52 7.50 6.15 6.42 7.60 7.80 9.38 5.53 6.30 4.33
Tanzania 6.90  6.48 6.14 7.61 6.74 5.99 6.23 5.85 9.16 7.28 5.33
Malawi 6.89  5.87 6.29 7.90 7.42 5.78 7.84 3.52 8.45 8.43 7.00
Togo 6.83  5.50 7.54 7.48 8.17  7.56 6.56 4.26 8.21 6.98 6.33
Pakistan 6.82  7.08 6.43 6.83 6.11 6.47 6.01 8.58 6.44 7.34 6.73
Madagascar 6.81  5.06 7.24 7.83 7.94 6.68 6.88 4.89 8.15 7.74 5.00
Mozambique 6.79  5.53 6.12 8.05 6.80 5.05 7.23 5.05 9.20 7.15 3.67
Myanmar   6.79  6.96 7.15 6.47 6.25 6.75 6.96 8.81 6.75 5.20 4.73
Bangladesh 6.77  6.25 7.68 6.72 7.76 8.25 5.77 7.68 6.48 7.03 4.33
Cameroon 6.77  6.02 7.06 7.23 6.60 7.28 6.52 5.56 7.81 7.48 4.33
Mali 6.76  5.40 6.34 8.01 9.02 5.73 7.13 4.14 9.34 7.20 4.33
Laos 6.67  5.83 7.05 7.15 6.16  5.93 7.11 6.41 7.14 7.00 3.67
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Table 2A 
Fragility index scoring scale 
Score Description 
1-3.5  Country performing well relative to others 
3.5-6.5  Country performing at or around the median 
6.5+  Country performing poorly relative to others 




  ETHDIV  ETHRISK  FRG GDPG HDI HREM  LDEM  LPPP  TRAD 
E T H D I V   1 . 0 0           
ETHRISK  0.13  1.00         
FRG  0.41  -0.01  1.00        
GDPG  0.05  0.14  -0.12  1.00       
HDI -0.38  0.13  -0.89  0.04  1.00      
HREM  0.00 -0.04 -0.35 -0.35  0.24  1.00       
LDEM 0.07  0.24  -0.33  -0.32  0.28  0.85 1.00    
LPPP -0.34  0.13  -0.82  -0.08 0.85 0.32 0.35 1.00   

















Determinants of fragility 
Dependent variable: fragility index, 4 and above 
Explanatory 
variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


























































Demo*Demo  – -0.01**
(-1.97) 
– – –  -0.01** 
(-3.21) 
– – 
















Trade*Trade  – –  0.01 
(0.64) 
– – – – – 




– – – 
Hrem*Hrem  – – – –  -0.01 
(-1.55) 
– – – 
HDI  – – – – –  -4.63** 
(-11.68) 
– – 
Ethrisk  – – – – – –  0.05** 
(3.68) 
– 
Ethdiv  – – – – – – –  0.50**
(3.08) 
















































       
N  116 116 116 129 129 118  89  101 
Adj. R2  0.81 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.82 
Note:   Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values. Standard errors 
are White-robust. *(**) indicates 10(5) % level of significance. 
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Table 5A 
Determinants of fragility  
Dependent variable: fragility index, 6 and above 
Explanatory 
variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
      


























































Demo*Demo  – -0.01** 
(-1.94) 
– – –  -0.01**
(-2.58) 
– - 
















Trade*Trade  – –  0.01**
(1.17) 
– – – –  – 




– –  – 
Hrem*Hrem  – – – –  -0.01 
(-1.24) 
– –  – 
HDI  – – – – –  -3.02**
(-4.88) 
– – 
Ethrisk  – – – – – –  0.06 
(2.53) 
– 
Ethdiv  – – – – – – –  0.39* 
(1.90) 
















































      
N  55 55 55 57 57 56 38  42 
Adj. R2  0.51 0.56 0.52 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.67  0.57 
Note:   Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values. Standard errors 
are White-robust. *(**) indicates 10(5) per cent level of significance. 25 
Table 6A 
Logit results (top 40 fragile countries coded as ‘1’) 
Explanatory 
variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       


























































Demo*Demo  – -0.02 
(-1.15) 
– – –  -0.02 
(-1.10) 
– – 
















Trade*Trade  – –  0.01 
(1.35) 
– – – – – 




– – – 
Hrem*Hrem  – – – –  -0.15 
(-1.60) 
– – – 
HDI  – – – – –  -28.57** 
(-4.26) 
– – 
Ethrisk  – – – – – –  0.26** 
(1.88) 
– 
Ethdiv  – – – – – – –  2.49 
(1.20) 











































       
N  116 116 116 129 129 118  89 101 
LR  Statistic  96.91 98.29 98.08  112.53 115.63 106.68  76.43  86.06 
Pseudo R2  0.70 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.78 
Note:   Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values. Standard errors 






Table 7A  
Logit results (top 60 fragile countries coded as ‘1’) 
Explanatory 
variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


























































Demo*Demo  – -0.02 
(-1.20) 
– – –  -0.04* 
(-1.85) 
– – 
















Trade*Trade  – –  0.01 
(1.15) 
– – – – – 




– – – 
Hrem*Hrem  – – – –  -0.05 
(-0.79) 
– – – 
HDI  – – – – –  -35.45**
(-3.71) 
– – 
Ethrisk  – – – – – –  0.11 
(0.94) 
– 
Ethdiv  – – – – – – –  3.07 
(1.45) 
















































      
N  116 116 116 129 129 118  89  101 
LR Statistic  105.21  106.72  106.38  120.39 121.04 126.56  73.04  91.08 
Pseudo R2  0.66 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.78 0.62 0.68 
Note:   Except where indicated otherwise, the figures in parentheses are the t-values. Standard errors 
are White-robust. *(**) indicates 10(5) per cent level of significance.  
 27 
Table 8A 





































































Sudan  6.79  Tanzania  5.64  Armenia  4.99  Argentina  4.09 
Somalia  6.77  Mali  5.61  Ukraine  4.97  Greece  3.93 
Afghanistan  6.69 Senegal  5.60 Mongolia  4.96  St Kitts and Nevis  3.92
Burundi  6.67 Guatemala  5.60 El Salvador  4.92  Poland  3.91
Iraq  6.55 Uzbekistan  5.59 Peru  4.90  Dominica  3.90
DRC  6.50 Zambia  5.58 Maldives  4.89  Bahamas  3.88
Yemen  6.46 Papua New Guinea  5.55 Jordan  4.86  Mauritius  3.87
Haiti  6.45 Sao Tome & Principe  5.53 Macedonia  4.84  Costa Rica  3.87
Liberia  6.39 Azerbaijan  5.49 South Africa  4.84  Latvia  3.85
Ethiopia  6.38 Georgia  5.48 Jamaica  4.84  South Korea  3.82
Angola  6.35 Indonesia  5.46 Paraguay  4.82  Slovakia  3.81
Palestinian Territories  6.35 Lebanon  5.45 Tonga  4.80  Estonia  3.79
Côte d’Ivoire  6.35 Ghana  5.44 Qatar  4.80  Cyprus  3.76
Eritrea  6.32 Solomon Islands  5.43 Micronesia  4.77  Hungary  3.74
Nigeria  6.31 Mozambique  5.42 Cuba  4.75  Chile  3.73
Chad  6.27 Kyrgyzstan  5.42 Namibia  4.74  Italy  3.73
Sierra Leone  6.25 Madagascar  5.42 Cape Verde  4.73  Singapore  3.68
Pakistan  6.18 Honduras  5.41 Albania  4.70  Spain  3.67
Guinea  6.18 Algeria  5.37 Mexico  4.68  Uruguay  3.67
Nepal  6.15 Nicaragua  5.36 Belize  4.66  Czech Republic  3.62
Mauritania  6.14 Syria  5.35 Brazil  4.63  France  3.62
Guinea-Bissau  6.14 Saudi Arabia  5.35 UAE  4.62  United States  3.61
CAR  6.12 Lesotho  5.35 Tunisia  4.61  United Kingdom  3.55
Uganda  6.11 Timor-Leste  5.33 Thailand  4.60  Lithuania  3.54
Togo  6.10 Bhutan  5.32 Fiji  4.59  Malta  3.54
Eq. Guinea  6.10 Egypt  5.32 Bahrain  4.58  Portugal  3.53
Kenya  6.06 Turkmenistan  5.31 Samoa  4.57  Netherlands  3.41
Congo, Rep.  6.05 Serbia-Montenegro  5.30 Oman  4.57  Belgium  3.38
Djibouti  6.03 Sri Lanka  5.29 Trinidad & Tobago  4.57  Japan  3.35
Rwanda  5.95 Colombia  5.24 St Vincent   4.51  Barbados  3.35
Niger  5.92 Turkey  5.20 & the Grenadines  Germany  3.34
Zimbabwe  5.92 Ecuador  5.18 Romania  4.51  Slovenia  3.33
Myanmar (Burma)  5.90 Vanuatu  5.15 Belarus  4.50  Ireland  3.17
Laos  5.88 Bosnia-Herzegovina  5.14 Panama  4.47  Australia  3.16
North Korea  5.88 Bolivia  5.13 Kiribati  4.46  Luxembourg  3.13
Iran  5.85 Gabon  5.13 Suriname  4.46  Austria  3.09
Cameroon  5.85 Venezuela  5.13 Antigua & Barbuda  4.45  New Zealand  3.07
Swaziland  5.84 Morocco  5.12 Kuwait  4.44  Switzerland  3.03
Comoros  5.84 Vietnam  5.11 Malaysia  4.41  Canada  3.02
Bangladesh  5.79 Philippines  5.10 Botswana  4.40  Denmark  2.81
Tajikistan  5.78 Guyana  5.09 Bulgaria  4.36  Finland  2.69
Burkina Faso  5.76 Moldova  5.06 Grenada  4.31  Sweden  2.68
India  5.71 China  5.06 Seychelles  4.27  Hong Kong  2.66
Benin  5.68 Russia  5.04 Israel  4.25  Norway  2.63
Gambia  5.68 Dominican Rep.  5.02 St Lucia  4.16  Iceland  2.56
Cambodia  5.66 Kazakhstan  5.00 Brunei   4.13   
Malawi  5.65 Libya  4.99 Croatia  4.13     
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Table 9A 
CIFP 2007 top 40 countries broken down by authority, legitimacy, and capacity 
Country 
Authority 
index     Country 
Legitimacy 
index    Country 
Capacity 
index 
Sudan  7.20     Saudi Arabia  7.41     Burundi  6.85 
Afghanistan  7.01     Libya  7.17    Djibouti  6.84 
Iraq  6.96     North Korea  7.14    Ethiopia  6.81 
DRC  6.91     Yemen  7.06    Mauritania  6.78 
Palestinian Territories  6.79     Somalia  7.00    Niger  6.76 
Burundi  6.77     Iraq  6.96    Somalia  6.75 
Côte d’Ivoire  6.76     United Arab Emirates  6.92    Sierra Leone  6.73 
Angola  6.75     Turkmenistan  6.89    Sudan  6.69 
Nigeria  6.70     Equatorial Guinea  6.79    Eritrea  6.62 
Somalia  6.62     Iran  6.76    Burkina Faso  6.62 
Liberia  6.59     Syria  6.70    Mali  6.61 
Haiti  6.58     Belarus  6.67    Haiti  6.60 
Myanmar (Burma)  6.43     Uzbekistan  6.66    Mozambique  6.60 
Nepal  6.42     Qatar  6.66    Benin  6.59 
Pakistan  6.32     Palestinian Territories  6.60    Sao Tome and Principe 6.57 
Guinea-Bissau  6.31     Lebanon  6.57    Yemen  6.57 
Indonesia  6.27     Bahrain  6.51    Afghanistan  6.55 
Iran  6.25     Egypt  6.48    Zambia  6.53 
Ethiopia  6.22     Eritrea  6.47    Guinea  6.50 
Central African Rep.  6.17     Zimbabwe  6.46    Chad  6.49 
Serbia-Montenegro  6.16     Nigeria  6.40    Comoros  6.48 
India  6.16     Brunei Darussalam  6.39    Rwanda  6.47 
Congo, Rep.  6.15     Côte d’Ivoire  6.38    Uganda  6.40 
Uganda  6.11     Swaziland  6.38    Togo  6.39 
Colombia  6.10     Mauritania  6.37    Malawi  6.38 
Kenya  6.08     Tajikistan  6.35    Senegal  6.35 
Chad  6.05     Afghanistan  6.35    Equatorial Guinea  6.35 
Sierra Leone  5.96     Kazakhstan  6.34    Tanzania  6.34 
Yemen  5.94     Sudan  6.32    DRC  6.33 
Russia  5.94     Cuba  6.31    Swaziland  6.33 
Bangladesh  5.89     Bhutan  6.30    Liberia  6.33 
Venezuela  5.79     Guinea  6.28    Lesotho  6.32 
Togo  5.78     Cameroon  6.28    Guinea-Bissau  6.30 
Eritrea  5.78     Azerbaijan  6.26    Micronesia  6.23 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  5.72     Russia  6.24    Vanuatu  6.17 
Philippines  5.71     Central African Rep.  6.22    Timor-Leste  6.16 
Guinea  5.70     Algeria  6.19    Madagascar  6.15 
Laos  5.69     Chad  6.17    Kenya  6.15 
Cameroon  5.67     Liberia  6.16    Nepal  6.14 
Zimbabwe  5.66     DRC  6.15    Pakistan  6.13 
 
 
 